The Politics of Fear in Colonial America: Three Fear Empowered Routes to Revolution

            The principal passion of pre-revolutionary period was fear. Whether it was fear of loss of liberty to a corrupt, power-hungry state, “driven by an uncontrollable lust for domination,” or fear of “danger of violent death,” Colonial Americans were governed as much by their passions as by their reason, despite the culture’s stress on the latter.[1] But how and why did these fears exist, more or less, across all thirteen colonies that joined together on July 4th, 1776? The answer culminates in an environment of fear exemplified with the democratic populism that existed across all thirteen colonies which feared subjection into slavery to the Crown and Parliament through an improper balance of authority and liberty.[2] To illustrate theses colonial fears, the colonies of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia will undergo examination to demonstrate how colonial populism provided the general conditions for revolution in a climate of fear.[3] Consequently, since the American Revolution was driven by fear this implanted the seed of the politics of fear into the American Republic from its birth to the present.

Rise of the British Empire—The Origins of Colonial Fears:

            The sources of Americans’ fear of losing liberty to abuses of power by the English state were, paradoxically, of British origin. Having suffered through two civil wars during the seventeenth century, England achieved political stability during the eighteenth century, one in which the Crown and Parliament checked and balanced each other. But “there was no automatic integration of these two authorities,” for neither side was superior to the other, and thus either side had to resort to a “series of conventions” or “accommodations, achieved by the use of what was called, technically, ‘influence.’”[4] Such influence—including patronage and management of Parliament’s elections—while providing stability, also produced “ferocious, ideologically charged opposition,” whose rhetoric against the party in office expressed deep and abiding fears of how abuse of power would subvert the liberty of those outside of government within both the British public and in the British American colonies.[5]

Colonial Fear’s First Specter—Threat of Annihilation:

            Nonetheless, the initially positive colonial response to the rise of the British Empire’s power arose from a more primal cause: fear.[6] This political culture of fear in the British colonies arose from the most immediately pressing fear to the colonies—and the most historically and socially experienced—was the threat of annihilation, or “fear of violent death,”  by the French and their native allies.[7] Some colonies experienced attacks—or feared attacks—by the French and natives more than others were the primary causes of conflict and the origin of an environment of fear in the colonies.[8] As a result, the colonies looked increasingly towards London for protection against the French and natives as they expanded westward in search of more land and economic opportunity.[9] London proved more than willing as it increased the peace and wartime presence of its forces over the first half of the 18th century.[10] However, this colonial fear culminated with the outbreak of the French and Indian War in western Pennsylvania that brought the colonies together to fight their enemies with the mother country.[11] As quickly as it came, this climax of wartime fear passed with the French and native defeat in the French and Indian War and after Pontiacs Rebellion but was replaced with a new colonial fear: the abuse of imperial power over the colonies through its new policies of increased taxation, the presence of a massive peacetime army, and barring of westward expansion.[12]

The Second Specter of Colonial Fear—Tyrannical Abuse of Power and Subjugation into Slavery:

            The colonial response to these new imperial policies was outrage, rooted in fear of a conspiracy of “seditious design” to take away their liberties and rights.[13] The British colonies historically had a sense of independence but remained loyal to the Crown when they had undisputed control over fiscal policy regarding the purse of the governor, enactment of taxes, and “creative powers” over land control and expanding the colonial legislatures role that proved irreconcilable to the interests of London.[14] Nonetheless, Parliament and the Crown attempted to centralize control by increasing—at least on paper—power for royal governors, subverting the role of the colonial legislature by enacting taxes by acts of Parliament in London, and attempting to halt westward expansion.[15] All of these forces bequeathed the opposition movement in the colonies—which arose in the 1720s with an opposition press—real momentum due to colonial fears that they would lose their rights as British citizens and become slaves.[16] However, it’s startling how such vastly different and diverse colonies came together in 1776 despite the general environment of fear in the colonies.[17] To illustrate how this happened, the case studies of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia will now be examined.

Massachusetts—Overcoming the Specter of Puritanism with a Commercial Spirit:

            In overcoming its Puritan past, Massachusetts’ commercial spirit for the pursuit of the natural right of property was unleashed and became the source for colonial fears in Massachusetts which occurred due to conflict between the Massachusetts colonial legislature and its appointed royal governor.[18] Under the original charter—when the colony was founded by the Puritans—the colonists in Massachusetts voted for their legislature and governor.[19] However, while this was kind of a republican form of government, the end of the puritan state wasn’t the seeking the proper balance of liberty and authority but preserving purity to guide the proper balance of liberty and authority.[20] Liberty was obedience to good laws—authority—rooted in the scriptures, purity.[21] Nonetheless, the Puritan state faced consistent crises of purity that eventually lead to its total collapse after the witch-hunt of 1692.[22] Prior to this were two important developments within the colony: firstly, the commercial character—later called the Puritan Work Ethic—of the immigrants that came to Massachusetts Bay which enabled those same immigrants to pursue private property and money despite their status as carnal inclinations from the perspective of Puritan theology.[23]

            Secondly, the revocation of Massachusetts Bay’s original charter that was replaced with a new secular charter in 1691 which replaced church membership as the requirement to vote with property ownership.[24] This was extremely traumatic because it removed a fundamental method of control for the clergy to maintain a puritan state and it implemented the appointment of a royal governor that was no longer democratically elected.[25] Just a year later, the last remnants of the puritan state were swept away by the aftermath of the 1692 witch-hunt.[26] The timely death of the puritan state allowed for the collusion of the commercial character of the colonists in Massachusetts Bay and the new property ownership requirement to vote to begin the formation of a democratic populism with a climate of fear within the colonists in regards to their property.[27] Since property was the new requirement to vote—no longer church membership—colonists began to rapidly acquire land, improve it, and cultivate it and receive the right to vote in increasing numbers.[28]

            Consequentially, land became scarcer near and along the coast and massive population growth into and during the 18th century required westward expansion into the interior.[29] Thanks to this, the Massachusetts’ colonists came to view their colonial government’s role as to preserve their natural right to property and to be fairly and equally represented based on a certain property requirement.[30] This led to a massive expansion of the colonial legislature’s membership and “creative powers” to be used regarding land distribution to be enacted.[31] These conditions created an environment of fearful democratic populism in the colonial population, raised the colonial legislature as the “soul” of liberty within the colony, and ensured a clash of royal and colonial power between the democratically elected colonial assembly and the appointed royal governor.[32] This conflict created the environment of fear within the populist colonists and their representatives in the colonial assembly because of the vast—but extremely inflexible—executive prerogative of the royal governor that was held as an imbalance of liberty and authority.[33] This abuse of power culminated within Massachusetts when the Crown ordered the royal governor to deny the further expansion of the assembly’s membership.[34] With this, the new taxes enacted not by the colonial legislature but by Parliament in London, a peacetime army stationed and quartered within their homes, and the prevention of westward expansion ignited the democratic populism’s fear of further abuse of power into colonial slavery which made Massachusetts join the American Revolution.[35]

Pennsylvania—The Specter of Radical Factionalism Overcome by “Whiteness:”

            While Massachusetts’ fears were primarily rooted in the protection of their “natural right” of property, Pennsylvania’s fears initially were due to the divisive religious and ethnic factionalism within the colony but were replaced with the “sheer terror” of racial warfare that created the concept of “whiteness.”[36] With its founding in 1682, Pennsylvania instituted a religiously ethnically tolerant colony that attracted different types of immigrants due to its fertile soil.[37] Nonetheless Pennsylvania’s greatest weakness was its diversity as it furnished vicious factionalism.[38] Across both religious and ethnic lines, this vicious factionalism witnessed a fervent competition for souls between religious sects and for ethnic dominance within Pennsylvanian politics.[39] Yet these various groups temporarily unified for one reason: throwing off the “autocratic” power of the proprietary governor and demanding an elected colonial legislature, which they received.[40] Consequentially, the factions within Pennsylvania resumed their battle to acquire political power—after receiving a colonial legislature—but always remained universally wary of their governor’s powers that would later act as a unifying factor with the other thirteen colonies.[41]

            However, this divisive factionalism was drowned with the conception of “whiteness” to unify Pennsylvanians against the “sheer terror” of racial warfare with the natives created a spirit of fearful democratic populism within the colony.[42] In Pennsylvania’s earliest days, the colony maintained good relations with the native population but there was a racial and religious distinction of “otherness” between the colonists and the natives.[43] Although this distinction of “racial” otherness existed, it was not strong enough to unify the colonist’s sense of “otherness” towards each other, which prevented a unified “white people” from prevailing.[44] Nevertheless, this began to change with the “sheer terror” of racial conflict that peaked with the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s Rebellion.[45] This isn’t to say there wasn’t race wars on the frontier and within Pennsylvania itself before 1755 but the amount of “sheer terror” that overcame the colonial populace from 1755-1764 was unrivaled from any prior racial warfare.[46] While the concept of “whiteness” developed during the French and Indian War, its implications are obvious to a modern observer but those same consequences were not apparent to those who first read, heard, and experienced it.[47]

            Initially the concept of “whiteness” was used against other whites to target political enemies.[48] However, “whiteness” developed a democratic spirit because—despite the extreme factionalism within Pennsylvania—colonial representatives began to appeal to all “white people” in elections to the colonial legislature.[49] As many learned, like Ben Franklin, there came a point where targeting “white people” was political suicide.[50] Consequentially, internal divisions progressively disappeared and the new conflict became the competition for power between the colonial legislature and the governor.[51] As such, the colonial legislature sought as much as possible to limit the governor’s authority to preserve the proper balance between liberty and authority.[52] Additionally, the colonial legislature and the populist Pennsylvanians viewed the successive governors as “autocrats” whose ambition for power after power required vigilant checking.[53] The populist conflict between legislature and governor acted as a unifying force with the other colonies.[54] Also, the Crown and Parliament’s attempted prevention of westward expansion acted as a universal source of fearful grievance for all thirteen colonies and helped drive Pennsylvania into the American Revolution.[55]

Virginia—Specter of Class Warfare Replaced with Populist Racial Solidarity and with Slavery:

            Like Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, Virginia had its own internal fears to overcome in order to embrace the revolution: class conflict between whites; however, resolving this class conflict would create the greatest paradox of American history that required the bloody annulment of civil war: American freedom with American slavery.[56] In 1618, Virginia underwent a series of reforms meant to reconstruct Virginia after the image of England.[57] Nonetheless these reforms failed and prompted the King to dissolve the Virginia Company and assert royal control over Virginia in 1624.[58] But these reforms introduced the foundations for the central paradox of American history: the marriage of freedom with slavery with the introduction of indentured servitude.[59] However, no one considered the implications of indentured servitude as the Virginian tobacco boom began. The tobacco boom, in the long-term, helped create a class of great planters who acquired wealth, land, servants, and power through the House of Burgesses (HOB); a class of poor planters; and a class of indentured servants hoping to become free and independent.[60] However, this new social structure experienced immense class tensions as swine allowed for greater life expectancy, which allowed a class of armed and discontented freedmen to emerge.[61] Fearing class conflict, the elite in the HOB purposely directed the freedmen to the frontier to redirect class tensions into racial hatred against the natives.[62]

            Yet the eruption of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676 revealed Virginia’s immense underlying class tensions amongst whites and eliminated the reliability of indentured servants as a stable labor force.[63] Competition for dominance amongst whites would permanently place Virginia in a state of perpetual class warfare.[64] Virginian colonial experience taught that redirecting class tensions into racial hatred could ease class tensions but a new racial scapegoat was needed for white harmony regardless of class commenced the move towards slavery.[65] However, the introduction of slavery into the colony presented the colonial elite with an immense reminder that during Bacon’s Rebellion poor whites fought alongside blacks.[66] In response, the HOB racially consolidated the white population—regardless of class—together against the black slave population through legislation.[67] The HOB striped black slaves of all effective political and legal right—in a colony espousing England/Britain’s tradition of liberty and freedom—with the introduction of black codes.[68] These laws dehumanized blacks to allow poor whites to redirect class tensions into racial fury while consolidating the white population with the fears of black rebellion against white racial dominance.[69]

            These laws instilled into Virginia the system of black slavery that both funded the country’s coming war effort and would tear the country apart in the 19th century.[70] But it also introduced a sense of racial democratic populism among the white population and the fearful awareness of what total subjugation to another’s will looked like, which produced the fear of abuse of power and subjection to slavery by the rapid growth of British imperial power over, and imperial involvement in, the colonies.[71] This was initially in response to the Crown’s attempts to disrupt the influence of the provincial magnates, which ignited a new struggle for power between the HOB and the royal governor.[72] Although there were prior conflicts between the royal governor and the Virginian elite, this was the first time the Crown itself went after the colonial elite.[73] Responding, the elite began—through the legal institution of slavery—consolidating the white population by appealing to all whites, regardless of class, in political showdowns with the royal governor.[74] In each popular showdown, the HOB defeated the intentions of the royal governor, which empowered both the elite by maintaining their power within the colony and the lower class whites by making them involved directly with the political process.[75] Like with Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, Virginia also conflicted with the crown and its royal governor over westward expansion—with a peacetime force to enforce the Proclamation Line of 1763—that acted as another unifier with the other colonies that helped motivate Virginia to join the American Revolution and furnish America’s early presidents, leaders, and political thinkers.[76]

Intellectual Foundations of the American Revolution:

           Nevertheless, what foundation did the fearful—yet seemingly rational fears of—colonial democratic populism stand upon? Fear of the abuse of power was a reality for British Colonial America.[77] However, where did this fear originate intellectually? Many would argue that this fear came not from abstract political theory but from the illustrated colonial experiences—from the “fear of violent death” and the fear of abuse of power—that drove the colonists to revolution.[78] This is impossible to deny, through reflecting on the early historical conditions of the American colonies promoted an extreme sense of independence during the 17th century.[79] Therefore, it is not surprising to see an overwhelming environment of fear in the colonies.[80] But this fear in the colonies was exacerbated by Lockean political principles.[81] An analysis of the Declaration of Independence reveals Locke’s penetration into American political thought.[82]  In the first opening paragraphs of the Declaration, the inalienable right’s doctrine, the consent of the governed, self-evident truths, and the threat of absolutism to liberty are almost word-for-word from Locke.[83]

         Most importantly to this discussion of the politics of colonial fears and fearful democratic populism is the list of grievances the newly independent states raised against the Governors, Parliament, and Crown.[84] The Declaration follows Locke’s rubric for the right to revolution that after “patient sufferance” due to a “long Train of Abuses and Usurpations” the right to revolution can justly be invoked.[85] Unjust abuses that can lead to revolution include abuse of the legislature by the executive, abusing or ignoring the rights of your subjects, and not preserving the security of your subjects.[86] Nevertheless, the critical element within the list of grievances the Declaration lays out is the concern upon the abuse of the legislature as the colonist viewed—consistently with Locke—that the colonial assembly was the soul of liberty and the supreme power within the colonial government structure.[87] Obviously, Locke was influential on American thinking but the question has been raised how influential was Locke for the colonial opposition? Was he merely the “skeleton” with the “flesh” originating from a different source in colonial America?[88]

        Bernard Bailyn, in The Origins of American Politics, discusses the “skeleton” of the oppositional forces political ideals in Britain, and later in colonial America, was Lockean while the “flesh” was not.[89] However, as one reviews the political principles of the opposition’s “flesh,” these principles are in fact Lockean.[90] Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government, addresses the threat of absolute monarchy (and absolutism in general), seeking the proper balance of liberty and authority, and the restless threat of a “sedate settled design” by power hungry men.[91] Clearly, the “flesh” is far more Lockean than Bailyn portrays it to be, but even if it was not, flesh cannot function without a “skeleton.”[92] Semantics aside, the fear that Bailyn discusses is undeniably a fundamental, if subtle, element of Locke’s political thought.[93] As one reads Locke, it is clear—if one is not careful—an individual reading this will become a militant defender of rights who is continuously, fearfully vigilant against an unjust government’s abuses of power best expressed best by Locke’s right to revolution.[94]

        Additionally, Locke’s political thought exacerbated the fears that colonial Americans held in the 18th century, which produced the fearful rhetoric, that Bailyn highlights, and the colonial environment of fear that allowed the Second Continental Congress to declare the thirteen states independent in July 1776.[95] But this fear, from the colonial perspective, was a rational fear as it was ignited in light of a seemingly impending threat to their natural rights of life, liberty, the pursuit of property, and the pursuit of happiness which—within the colonial perspective—are self-evident, rational truths.[96] Even so, these rights can easily vanish without militant, fearful vigilance which consequently produces an environment of fear.[97] Therefore, wherever a rights doctrine exists a fear of abuse of power is necessarily present, which furnishes an environment of fear; in the colonies’ cases, these factors were present but were exacerbated by the presence of democratic populism rooted in republican ideals.[98]

Revolution:

            Through the rise of the British Empire’s vast imperial power, it initially integrated the colonies and centralized control over the colonies after 1688. However, after the removal of the French and native threat, the colonists began to look towards London with fearful apprehension about the various policies that Parliament and the Crown were enacting without their consent and that went against their economic, political, and social interests. Additionally, the near universal presence of: colonial legislatures, conflict between the governors and colonial legislatures; westward expansion due to massive population growth; and the presence of a fearful democratic populism helped unite the thirteen colonies in July 1776. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia each had peculiar specters to overcome before developing a fearful democratic populism expressed in republican principles that culminated in the fearful Declaration of Independence and the birth of an “empire of liberty.”[99]

           However, this environment of fear that produced fearful democratic populism consequently impacted American politics far beyond the time of the Revolution.[100] From the debate over the Federal Constitution to the Whiskey Rebellion, the fear over the expansion of slavery to the fear over the waves of immigration into the United States, and from the “Red Scare” and McCarthyism, the politics of fear has been and will maintain itself as a paramount force in American political life.[101] Fear. Fear never changes. Its manifestations mutate like the human passions but its power over everyone’s lives never change.[102]

Endnotes

[1] Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 11; 13; 41; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. Macpherson, (New York: Penguin Classics, 1985), 186.
[2] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 56; 63; Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood Letters, Letter #2.
[3] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 105; Hobbes, Leviathan, 186.
[4] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 28.
[5] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 19; 21; 31-32; 41-43; 52; 79; Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, (New York: Norton & Company, 1975), 340.
[6] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13.
[7] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 13; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 108-109; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 76-78; 81; 130; 149; 230; 232; Richard Weisman, Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts, (Amherst: Massachusetts University Press, 1984), 124; Peter Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 40; Hobbes, Leviathan, 186.
[8] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 13; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 136; Weisman, Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts, 124; Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 7.
[9] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 100; 103; Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 7.
[10] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 109-11.
[11] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 108; Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 95-96.
[12] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 111-112 Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 7-8; 13; 56; 67-69.
[13] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 114; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 41.
[14] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 90; 100; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 7-8; 67-69; 102-103.
[15] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 7-8; 67-69; 102-103; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 113-115.
[16] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 56; 63; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 79; 104-105; 114.
[17] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13.
[18] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 68; 70; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 114-115.
[19] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 68; 70; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 296.
[20] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 68; 71; 90; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 56; 63; John Winthrop, On Liberty, 1640, PDF, 1-2.
[21] Winthrop, On Liberty, 1640, PDF, 2.
[22] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 72.
[23] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 68; 70; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 296.
[24] Weisman, Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts, 125; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 98.
[25] Weisman, Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts, 125.
[26] Weisman, Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts, 167; 170-171; 176.
[27] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 68; 70; Weisman, Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts, 125; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 105; 115.
[28] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 86-87; 102-103.
[29] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 103.
[30] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 115; Morgan, Puritan Political Ideas, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1965), 271.
[31] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 102-103.
[32] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 61; 67-69; 88; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 355-357.
[33] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 56; 63; 67-69; 71-72.
[34] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 81; 83.
[35] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 113-115; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11;13; 105; 160-161
[36] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 64-65; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 94-96; Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 3-4; 114; 222; 225-226.
[37] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 94-96.
[38] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 64-65; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 95-96; Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 3-4.
[39] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 22-23; 31.
[40] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 75; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 96.
[41] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 67-69; 75; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 96; Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 97; 99.
[42] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 40-41; 45; 114.
[43] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 3-4; 16; 28-29.
[44] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 16; 28-29; 34.
[45] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 40-41; 45; 195; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 109.
[46] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 40-41; 45; 195.
[47] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 114; 116.
[48] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 99; 122-123.
[49] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 218; 222; 225-226.
[50] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 224.
[51] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 218; 222; 225-226; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 55; 67-69; 75.
[52] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 191; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 56; 63; 75.
[53] Sliver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, 191; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 75.
[54] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 67-69.
[55] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 113-115; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 125.
[56] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 5; 266; 304; 346; James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), vii; 5; 13; 16.
[57] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 94-97.
[58] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 107.
[59] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 5; 107.
[60] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 129; 225
[61] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 136; 215; 218.
[62] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 130; 149; 230; 233.
[63] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 269-270.
[64] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 266; Richard L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), 38-39; 42-43.
[65] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 130; 149; 269-270; Rubenstein, The Cunning of History, 38-39; 42-43.
[66] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 257; 328.
[67] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 311-313; 328; 338.
[68] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 312-314; Rubenstein, The Cunning of History, 42.
[69] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 257; 316; 328; 334-335; Rubenstein, The Cunning of History, 42-43.
[70] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 5; 314-315; McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution, vii; 5; 13; 16.
[71] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 338; 344-346; 376; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 56; 63; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 64-65.
[72] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 345; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 97.
[73] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 345.
[74] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 344-346; 362.
[75] Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 344-346; 362.
[76] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 99; 105; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 369; 371-373; 376.
[77] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 133-155.
[78] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 41; Hobbes, Leviathan, 186.
[79] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 14-15; 19; Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 90.
[80] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13.
[81] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 41.
[82] Declaration of Independence, 1776, PDF, 1-3; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 41; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 369; 371-373; 376.
[83] Declaration of Independence, 1; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 271-272; 276; 331.
[84] Declaration of Independence, 1-3.
[85] Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 406-407; 409; 411; 415.
[86] Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 406-407; 409; 411; 415.
[87] Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 355-357; 360; 415; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 7-10; 59; 62-63
[88] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 41.
[89] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 41.
[90] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 41-43; 47; 56; 63.
[91] Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 272; 276; 278; 357; 364-365.
[92] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 41.
[93] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 41.
[94] Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 271; 406-407; 409; 411; 415.
[95] Declaration of Independence, 1-3; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 41; 79.
[96] Declaration of Independence, 1-3; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 41; 79; [96] Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 271.
[97] Declaration of Independence, 1-3; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; 41; 79; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 271.
[98] McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution, 25; Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 271.
[99] Taylor, Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction, 122; Declaration of Independence, 1-3.
[100] Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 11; 13.
[101] David Kennedy, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 13th ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 182; 192; 196; 425; 568; 880; 890.

[102] Hobbes, Leviathan, 186.

Bibliography of Sources

Primary:

Declaration of Independence. 1776. PDF.

Franklin, Benjamin. Silence Dogood Letters. PDF.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by C. B. Macpherson. New York: Penguin Classics, 1985.

Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Winthrop, John. “Reasons for Emigrating to New England.” 1631.  PDF.

——. On Liberty. 1640. PDF.

Secondary:

Bailyn, Bernard. The Origins of American Politics. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.

Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Kennedy, David. The American Pageant: A History of the Republic. 13th Ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006.

McPherson, James M. Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Morgan, Edmund S. American Slavery, American Freedom. New York: Norton & Company, 1975.

——. Puritan Political Ideas. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Rubenstein, Richard L. The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975.

Sliver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.

Taylor, Alan. Colonial America: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Weisman, Richard. Witchcraft, Magic, and Religion in 17th-Century Massachusetts. Amherst: Massachusetts University Press, 1984.

Written By: Ani Manolatos

Image Credit: Wikipedia’s Page on the Boston Massacre

 

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